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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship betwe% the foreign loan
activity of multinational banks and their foreign representation. The investigation of
this relationship is important because it shows that the activities of multinational
banks cannot be described by an all-encompassing definition such as “international
banking”. The maturity structure of foreign bank loans was employed to
disentangle two distinct areas of multinational bank activity and show that the two
areas pose different requirements with respect to the presence of foreign bank
representatives.
1. Introduction
The rash of bad loans in Asia that has banks in Japan, Indonesia, Korea and
Thailand reeling on the brink of insolvency and has put a dent into the balance
sheets of many international banks once again shows that the greatest risk to banks
js the default on loans. In the same context, in many countries there is a pent up
interest in knowing what national  banks do abroad. Given the security people wish
to have with respect to their savings and other f’lnancial assets they often voice
questions regarding the international lending of their home-country banks. Do they
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lend to foreign banks or to foreign non-banking firms? Do they lend to other home-
country fm abroad? In which countries? Rich or poor countries? What is the
role of the foreign representatives in the placement of foreign loans?
Associated questions generate much of the controversy surrounding the theories of
multinational banking. Williams (1997) suggests that multinational banks derive
their advantage from the internalization of the information activities of the bank.
The question that arises is whether this applies equally to the inter-bank and non-
bank markets.
The purpose of this study is to answer some of these questions on the basis of the
foreign loans made by Dutch banks. Although it would be ideal to have a study that
would examine the behavior of the banks of many nationalities, such a study is not
feasible due to the nonexistence of data.’
2. Methodology
In order to determine the strategy of banks in terms of lending to different countries
and different sectors we concentrate on the maturity structure of foreign lending.
Following Diamond (1991, 1993) who shows the preponderant role of borrowers in
the determination of the maturity of loans, we take the maturity structure of bank
loans to be an endogenous variable. Thus, we assume that even if a bank has an
.
’ There are very few countries that present their bank claims on a country by country basis.
Although the US and France also disaggregate some of their foreign claims data, the differences
between the data sets do not allow for their simultau~us use. A comparison of the behavior of
American, French and Dutch banks on the basis of the available, yet different data, is beyond the
scope of this study.
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overall strategy regarding the maturity of loans, this objective will not be binding in
loans to particular countries and sectors. Then our approach is to explain the
maturity structure of bank loans on the basis of the clients served: countries, banks
or fm. Two equations designed to explain the amounts of short- and long-term
lending by Dutch banks to 34 countries are estimated. We use the size variables for
short- and long-term loans rather than the ratio of either short to long or short to
total loans because our primary interest is the role of Dutch representatives abroad.
A priori we may hypothesize that the assignment of representatives abroad is
determined by both the level and the composition of loans. In the appendix we
present an estimation on the ratio of short to long term loans for comparative
purposes.
One of the key decisions of Dutch banks is the choice of the sector - bank or non-
bank - to serve. In some countries Dutch banks will lead the pack in non-bank
lending. In others the choice will be to concentrate on lending to banks. The
choice will be reflected on the maturity of loans because banks borrow on shorter
term than non-banks: “The amounts involved are large . . . Maturities are short,
normally between overnight and six months . . . n2 Although some of these very
short loans might better be called “placement of excess funds” a review of the
available statistics over time reveals that the volumes of short-term loans are
growing fairly constantly over time.3
.
’ BIS, 1983, p. 7.
3 Please refer to the figures published in De Nederlandsche Bank: Kwamalbericht.
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In the explanation of Dutch short-term loans per country - Equation 1, at the end of
this section - we should expect that total bank borrowing and total non-bank
borrowing should exhibit a positive and a negative sign, respectively. In the
equation for long term lending, Equation 2, the signs should be the reverse, except
that for identification purposes we leave out bank borrowing in this equation.
Heinkel and Levi (1992),  ter Wengel(1995),  and Brealey and Kaplanis  (1996)
argue that bank representation abroad can be taken as an indicator of the business
done by the banks of the home or exporting country in the host country. Here we
propose to go one step further and examine the nature of the involvement of the
banks in the host country. Thus we hypothesize that banks with representatives
(branches, subsidiaries and representatives) in the host country will primarily
engage in lending to non-banking firms while banks without branches would be
typically lend to local banks. This would imply that bank representation should be
positively related to maturity. Thus, the presence of Dutch banks would show a
positive coefficient in the second equation.
At the same time it may be hypothesized that the presence of branches from other
foreign banks will have a negative effect on the value of long term loans extended
by Dutch banks. That is, other foreign banks will compete with the Dutch banks for
business in the host country and the sign of the coeffkient for this variable should
- be negative in the second equation.
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On the other hand we expect that Dutch banks with branches in a particular host
country would not lend to the domestic banks with which they are competing.
Thus, Dutch banks with representation in the host country would not register many
short term loans. The anticipated sign for Dutch bank representation in the short
term loan equation should be negative.
With respect to the presence of other nationality representatives it may be said that
if Dutch banks are not servicing the short-term market as suggested in the previous
paragraph, they would find  no effect from the presence of other nationality
representatives: the coefficient  would not be different from zero.
Heinkel and Levi, ter Wengel, and Brealey and Kaplanis  also explain international
bank representation on the basis of: the economic size GNP) of the host country,
the presence of other compatriot multinational enterprises in the host country, and
on the participation of the host country in the OECD. Ter Wengel(1995) suggests
that the development of the capital market, including the banking sector, is related
to GNP. Therefore it might be expected that the effect of GNP on long-term loans
by Dutch banks should be negative. The effect of GNP on short-term loans by
Dutch banks is an empirical question: a priori it is impossible to say whether Dutch
banks would fare better or worse in a country with a larger inter-bank market.
.
An often cited reason in the banking literature for banks to establish foreign
representation is to service home clients abroad. On the basis of this reasoning we
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should expect the presence of other Dutch enterprises to show a positive relation
with long-term lending.
The Basle capital adequacy agreement requires banks to maintain a ratio of 8
percent capital to risk-weighted assets. In the calculation of risk-weighted assets
non-financial companies anywhere in the world are applied a risk factor of 100
percent while loans to banks within the OECD are given a risk weight of only 20
percent.4  Therefore banks would find  it convenient to lend to OECD banks. Since
inter-bank loans are usually short maturity, the coefficient for an OECD O-l dummy
indicating OECD membership should have a positive coefficient  in the first
equation.
The model to be estimated is the following:
LSHORT=f( LBANK, LNOBNK, LNEDAG, LTOTAG, LGNP, MOECD) < 1 >
LLONG = g(LNOBNK,LNEDAG,  LTOTAG, LGNP, LMNC) < 2 >
Where:
LSHORT - the logarithm of short-term loans (two years or less) by Dutch banks by
.
country (34 destination countries);
LLONG - the logarithm of long-term loans by Dutch banks;
4 Hdboek  Wtk,  January 1998: 4011/4.
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LNOBNK - the logarithm of total foreign bank loans obtained by the
non-banking sector in the destination country from all other
countries;
LBANK  - the logarithm of total foreign bank loans to commercial banks in
the destination country from all other countries;
LNEDAG - the logarithm of the number of Dutch banking representatives
(branches, representatives, subsidiaries) in the destination country;
LTOTAG - the logarithm of the total of foreign bank representatives in the
destination country;
LGNP - the logarithm of GNP of the destination country;
MOECD - dichotomous variable indicating membership in the OECD;
LMNC - the logarithm of the number of other Dutch multinationals in the
destination country.
In Section 4 it is pointed out that Equations 1 and 2 are not independent and are
estimated by means of three stage least squares. Further, since bank representation
is probably related to the total amounts of loans outstanding, an instrumental
variables procedure is employed to deal with the endogeneity of the regressor in the
three stage analysis.
.
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3. Data
Data on the activities of international banks disaggregated at the country level is
very difficult  to find. Thus, Heinkel and Levi, ter Wengel, and Brealey and
Kaplanis  employ bank representation as a proxy for bank activity or bank assets.
Fortunately, however, the Netherlands, the US and France publish some data on the
claims of the consolidated banking sector vis-a-vis other countries. The Dutch
central bank provides data on the maturity composition of loans disaggregated by
country of destination. This data refers to loans made by banks from the
Netherlands either directly or through their foreign representatives. The data do
not include loans from the parent banks to their foreign representatives. Although
the US Treasury Bulletin and the Bulletin de la Barque de France provide data on
the total claims by US and French banks per country, the data are not broken down
according to maturity. Therefore, an exploration of the strategies of banks can only
be accomplished with the Dutch data.
The data on inter-bank loans and loans to non-bank enterprises by country of
destination were obtained from the International Monetary Fund International
Financial Statistics. The data on bank representation per country of destination
were obtained from Reed Business Information: The .Banker  ‘s AZman.ac. The term
.
representation covers the sum of the number of branches, subsidiaries and
representatives. A detailed description of this data base may be found in ter Wengel
(1995).
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The data on GNP and GNP per capita were derived from the World Bank, World
Tables, and the IMF Intemutional  Financial Statistics. The data on foreign
subsidiaries of multinational corporations were derived from John M. Stopford  The
World Directory of Multinational Enterprises.
Because the data on international bank representation refer to 1990, the data
employed for short- and long-term loans, and bank and non-bank lending, and GNP
refer to 1990. The data on multinational enterprises refers to 1982-1983. With
respect to the latter variable we think it would be highly desirable to get more up-to-
date data.
.
4. Empirical results
As mentioned in Section 2 the two equations presented in that Section cannot be
presumed to be independent: banks are known to set limits to their country
exposure. Therefore the two equations are estimated simultaneously by means of a
three-stage-least-squares procedure. Additionally, since the presence of a
representative (branch, subsidiary or representative) could be the result as well as
the cause of Dutch bank lending to a certain country, the presence of Dutch
representatives in the host country was specified to be endogenous.
Because it appears reasonable to expect that the presence of Dutch representatives
will be related to both the levels and the composition of lending, equations 1 and 2
are expressed in levels. A one equation two-stage-least-squares regression, not
presented here, with the ratio of short- to long-term lending as the dependent
variable produced basically the same results as the two-equation three stage
estimation except that it did not provide any indication with respect to the
importance of Dutch and other nationality representatives.
In spite of all the caveats that have to be made with respect to the measurement of
fit statistics, we note that the means square error (MSE)  and the weighted R-square
indicate a fairly good fit. “The system weighted MSE and system weighted R-
square measure the fit of the joint model obtained by stacking all the models
.
together and performing a single regression with the stacked observations weighted
by the inverse of the model error variances. *’ It deserves to be noted that the good
’ Sas Institute, SAWETS  User’s Guide,  p. 824.
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fit is not solely the result of the estimation in levels: the regression on the ratio of
short- to long-term loans referred to above also presented a good fit.
Table 1 presents the results of the estimation designed to determine the pattern of
foreign lending by Dutch banks. The regression estimates of equations 1 and 2 tend
to corroborate the hypothesis that inter-bank banking has a short-term character
while non-bank borrowers require longer term loans.
A comparison of equations 1 and 2 reveals that foreign representatives do not seem
to be necessary to operate in the inter-bank market. In contrast, the allocation of
long-term loans and the service of non-bank enterprises is positively related to the
presence of Dutch branches, subsidiaries and representatives. At the same time the
presence of representatives of banks with other nationalities lowers the value of the
non-bank loans that Dutch banks are able to place. In the equation for short-term
loans the variable for other nationality representatives had no explanatory power and
was excluded.
.
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Table 1. The pattern of foreign lending by Dutch banks
Dependent variable: LOANS-SHORT
Variable coefficient standard Level of significance
error
INTERCEP 3.968 1.134 * * *
L N O B N K 0.179 0.222
L B A N K 0.406 0.125 * * *
LNEDAG 0.124 0.137
LGNPJ 0.041 0.109
M O E C D 0.954 0.552 *
Dependent variable: LOANS-LONG
Variable coefficient standard Level of significance
error
MTERCEP 4.878 1.811 ***
L N O B N K 0.708 0.222 ***
LNEDAG 0.380 0.195 *
LTOTAG -0.485 0.235 * *
LGNPJ 0.204 0.124
LMNC 0.180 0.103 *
Levels of significance: *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level;
* significant at the 10% level
Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation
System Weighted MSE: 0.77465 with 56 degrees of freedom.
System Weighted R-Square: 0.7369
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Even though the above findings are based on Dutch data, they throw light on the
larger issue of multinational banking. Thus, Williams (1997) pointed out that
multinational banking comprises both: participation in the Euromarkets; and, the
provision of banking services in the host country by means of a representative.
Our results confirm the point made by Casson (1990) that multinational banking
should not be considered as a homogeneous activity but rather as a series of distinct
activities. Thus it appears that arms-length participation in the inter-bank market is
very different from the provision of banking services through local representation.
Only the latter form of multinational banking could be explained with the
internalization theory, derived from the Coasian theory of the firm,  examined by
Williams.
The coefficients  for income, measured as GNP did not prove to be significant at the
10 percent level. However, the GNP coefftcient  in the long-term loan equation was
nearly significant (significant at the 15 percent level) and therefore the variable was
not excluded from either equation.
The results with respect to OECD participation confirmed our hypothesis that banks
would find  it convenient to lend to OECD banks. Similarly the positive coefficient
for the presence of compatriot multinational corporations suggests that banks may
.
provide banking services for their home clients abroad.
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4. Conclusions
The analysis of the patterns of foreign short- and long-term lending by Dutch banks
confirms Casson’s observation that “banking itself is not a homogeneous activity,
but rather a collection of distinct though interdependent activities . . . n6 It appears
that the inter-bank and non-bank markets are distinct and serviced in different ways.
Thus, the inter-bank market does not require the presence of representatives to
collect information and disburse loans. On the other hand, because of the lower risk
weight attached to loans to OECD banks, membership in the OECD seems to
facilitate the placement of loans.
In contrast, foreign representatives are very important in the placement of long-term
loans abroad and the presence of banking representatives of other nationalities
makes it more difficult to place loans. Furthermore, multinational banks appear to
service the banking needs of compatriot multinational enterprises.
The difference between the two markets served by international banks signifies that
the internalization theory is only applicable to multinational banking carried out by
means of an international network of representatives serving non-banking clients.
This leaves two issues to be resolved:
1. What gives banks an advantage in the inter-bank market; and,
.
2. How do banks choose between the inter-bank and the non-bank markets.
6  “Casson,  1990, p. 14.
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